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#### **Engagement is the lynchpin of neoliberal expansion into Cuba**

**Wenston & Woods ’08** – Trotskyist political theorist and author and leading members of the International Marxist Tendency (Fred & Alan, “[Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro steps down](http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-steps-down/)”, http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-steps-down/)//VP

They all pretend to be democrats when it comes to Cuba. In reality they are like vultures waiting for the day they can get their beaks and claws into the flesh of Cuba. What they are after is the end of the economic system brought into being by the Cuban revolution. They want capitalism to return to Cuba. That is what they mean by “democracy”! Another fashionable term these days is “engagement”. While Bush sticks to his guns and insists on the embargo being stepped up, the more intelligent bourgeois, both in the USA and Europe are raising the need for “engagement”, i.e. on removing the embargo and opening up trade channels. Does this wing of the bourgeois have different interests or aims? No, they simply understand better than Bush and his obtuse circle of friends that the best way to re-introduce capitalism into Cuba is to lift the embargo, begin trading, flood Cuba with cash and let the process unfold.¶ That is why it is even more disgusting when we hear some reformist elements on the left advocating such “engagement”.What they are actually doing is giving the bourgeois advice on how to remove this thorn in their side**.¶** All this talk of democracy is in fact a cover for the real aims of imperialism. Not so long ago the Financial Times was giving more sober advice. They were suggesting a “Chinese road” for Cuba accompanied by a lifting of the US-sponsored embargo. The Chinese model would envisage an opening up of Cuba to capitalism accompanied by a firm grip on state power at the top.

#### Neoliberalism causes extinction

Darder, 10 – Professor Antonia Darder, Distinguished Professor of Education, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign (“Preface” in *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, & Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement* by Richard V. Kahn, 2010, pp. x-xiii)//VP

GENDER MODIFIED

It is fitting to begin my words about Richard Kahn’s Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement with a poem. The direct and succinct message of The Great Mother Wails cuts through our theorizing and opens us up to the very heart of the book’s message—to ignite a fire that speaks to **the ecological crisis** at hand; a crisis orchestrated by the inhumane greed and economic brutality of the wealthy. Nevertheless, as is clearly apparent, none of us is absolved from complicity with the devastating destruction of the earth. As members of the global community, we are all implicated in this destruction by the very manner in which we define ourselves, each other, and all living beings with whom we reside on the earth. Everywhere we look there are glaring signs of political systems and social structures that propel us toward **unsustainability and extinction**. In this historical moment, the planet faces some of the most horrendous forms of “[hu]man-made” devastation ever known to humankind. Cataclysmic “natural disasters” in the last decade have sung the environmental hymns of planetary imbalance and reckless environmental disregard. A striking feature of this ecological crisis, both locally and globally, is the **overwhelming concentration of wealth** held by the ruling elite and their agents of capital. This environmental malaise is characterized by the staggering loss of livelihood among working people everywhere; gross inequalities in educational opportunities; an absence of health care for millions; an unprecedented number of people living behind bars; and trillions spent on fabricated wars fundamentally tied to the control and domination of the planet’s resources. The Western ethos of mastery and supremacy over nature has accompanied, to our detriment, the unrelenting expansion of capitalism and its unparalleled domination over all aspects of human life. This hegemonic worldview has been unmercifully imparted through a host of public policies and practices that conveniently gloss over gross inequalities as commonsensical necessities for democracy to bloom. As a consequence, the liberal democratic rhetoric of “we are all created equal” hardly begins to touch the international pervasiveness of racism, patriarchy, technocracy, and economic piracy by the West, all which have fostered the erosion of civil rights and the unprecedented ecological exploitation of societies, creating conditions that now threaten our peril, if we do not reverse directions. Cataclysmic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, are unfortunate testimonies to the danger of ignoring the warnings of the natural world, especially when coupled with egregious governmental neglect of impoverished people. Equally disturbing, is the manner in which ecological crisis is vulgarly exploited by unscrupulous and ruthless capitalists who see no problem with turning a profit off the backs of ailing and mourning oppressed populations of every species—whether they be victims of weather disasters, catastrophic illnesses, industrial pollution, or inhumane practices of incarceration. Ultimately, these constitute ecological calamities that speak to the inhumanity and tyranny of material profiteering, at the expense of precious life. The arrogance and exploitation of neoliberal values of consumption dishonor the contemporary suffering of poor and marginalized populations around the globe. Neoliberalism denies or simply mocks (“Drill baby drill!”) the interrelationship and delicate balance that exists between all living beings, including the body earth. In its stead, values of individualism, competition, privatization, and the “free market” systematically debase the ancient ecological knowledge of indigenous populations, who have, implicitly or explicitly, rejected the fabricated ethos of “progress and democracy” propagated by the West. In its consuming frenzy to gobble up the natural resources of the planet for its own hyperbolic quest for material domination, the exploitative nature of capitalism and its burgeoning technocracy has dangerously deepened the structures of social exclusion, through the destruction of the very biodiversity that has been key to our global survival for millennia. Kahn insists that this devastation of all species and the planet must be fully recognized and soberly critiqued. But he does not stop there. Alongside, he rightly argues for political principles of engagement for the construction of a critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that is founded on economic redistribution, cultural and linguistic democracy, indigenous sovereignty, universal human rights, and a fundamental respect for all life. As such, Kahn seeks to bring us all back to a formidable relationship with the earth, one that is unquestionably rooted in an integral order of knowledge, imbued with physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual wisdom. Within the context of such an ecologically grounded epistemology, Kahn uncompromisingly argues that our organic relationship with the earth is also intimately tied to our struggles for cultural self-determination, environmental sustainability, social and material justice, and global peace. Through a carefully framed analysis of past disasters and current ecological crisis, Kahn issues an urgent call for a critical ecopedagogy that makes central explicit articulations of the ways in which societies construct ideological, political, and cultural systems, based on social structures and practices that can serve to promote ecological sustainability and biodiversity or, conversely, lead us down a disastrous path of unsustainability and extinction. In making his case, Kahn provides a grounded examination of the manner in which consuming capitalism manifests its repressive force throughout the globe, disrupting the very ecological order of knowledge essential to the planet’s sustainability. He offers an understanding of critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that inherently critiques the history of Western civilization and the anthropomorphic assumptions that sustain patriarchy and the subjugation of all subordinated living beings—assumptions that continue to inform traditional education discourses around the world. Kahn incisively demonstrates how a theory of multiple technoliteracies can be used to effectively critique the ecological corruption and destruction behind mainstream uses of technology and the media in the interest of the neoliberal marketplace. As such, his work points to the manner in which the sustainability rhetoric of mainstream environmentalism actually **camouflages** wretched neoliberal policies and practices that left unchecked **hasten the annihilation of the globe’s ecosystem**. True to its promise, the book cautions that any anti-hegemonic resistance movement that claims social justice, universal human rights, or global peace must contend forthrightly with the deteriorating ecological crisis at hand, as well as consider possible strategies and relationships that rupture the status quo and transform environmental conditions that threaten disaster. A failure to integrate ecological sustainability at the core of our political and pedagogical struggles for liberation, Kahn argues, is to blindly and misguidedly adhere to an anthropocentric worldview in which emancipatory dreams are deemed solely about human interests, without attention either to the health of the planet or to the well-being of all species with whom we walk the earth.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1ac to interrogate neoliberal economic engagement with latin America from the starting point of knowledge production- that is a prerequisite to breaking down neoliberalism

**Walsh, 12** – Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar (Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)//VP

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

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#### **Interpretation – economic engagement only includes the use of economic tools for contact**

Jakstaite, 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES” BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### **‘Its’ means ownership**

GEGT, 05 – Glossary of English Grammar Terms (2005, Using English, http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)//VP

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### **Violation – the aff establishes a framework for future engagement without actually economically engaging – it just normalizes relations**

#### Voting Issue-

## 1NC

#### Obama is using PC to hold the line on Iran sanctions now

Haaretz 1/22 Will AIPAC-Obama sanctions clash dent pro-Israel lobby’s clout?, 1/22/14, http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/1.569900

In previous AIPAC vs. White House dustups, the pro-Israel lobbying group’s strategy was to speak softly and let Congress carry the big stick.¶ But in the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s face-off with the Obama administration over new Iran sanctions, congressional support may not be so readily available and keeping a low public profile is proving impossible.¶ According to congressional insiders and some of the pro-Israel lobbying group’s former senior executives, AIPAC may soon face a tough choice: Stick out the battle over sanctions and potentially face a reputation-damaging defeat, or reach out to the White House and find a way for both sides to save face.¶ “I don’t believe this is sustainable, the confrontational posture,” said Steve Rosen, a former AIPAC foreign policy chief known for his hawkishness on Iran.¶ The Obama administration has taken a firm line against the sanctions bill backed by AIPAC, warning that the legislation would harm prospects for a achieving a diplomatic solution on the Iranian nuclear issue. Meanwhile, the confrontation has landed AIPAC squarely in the media spotlight and drawn pointed criticism from leading liberal commentators.¶ AIPAC has been stymied by a critical core of Senate Democrats who have sided with the Obama administration in the fight. While AIPAC’s bid to build a veto-busting majority has reached 59 -- eight short of the needed 67 -- it has stalled there in part because Democrats have more or less stopped signing on.¶ Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), the bill’s sponsors, rounded up 15 Democrats when the bill was introduced on December 19, just before Congress went on its Christmas recess. Since Congress returned this month, however, they have added just one Democrat, Michael Bennet of Colorado.¶ AIPAC, however, says its bid to pass sanctions is on track.¶ “Our top priority is stopping Iran's nuclear program, and consequently we are very engaged in building support for the Menendez-Kirk bill which now has the bi-partisan co-sponsorship of 59 senators,” AIPAC’s spokesman, Marshall Wittman, wrote in an email to JTA. “This measure would provide our negotiators with critical leverage in their efforts to achieve a peaceful end to Iran's nuclear weapons program.”¶ But in a recent interview with The New Yorker, President Obama appeared confident that backers of the bill would not reach a veto-proof majority.¶ “I don’t think a new sanctions bill will reach my desk during this period, but if it did, I would veto it and expect it to be sustained,” Obama said.¶ A source close to AIPAC said the stall in support for the legislation is due in part to the fact that of 10 committee chairmen opposed to the bill, four are Jewish and have histories of closeness to the pro-Israel community.¶ Non-Jewish lawmakers tend to take their cues on Israel-related issues from their Jewish colleagues -- a common template with lawmakers from other communities -- and this is no different, the source said.¶ AIPAC’s determined push on sanctions is drawing some anger from Democrats. A number of party insiders say that staffers on Capitol Hill are referring openly to AIPAC as an antagonist on the Iran issue in private conversations.¶ “Now it just looks like AIPAC is backing a partisan bill rather than pushing a bipartisan policy to stop Iran," said a former Democratic Hill staffer who deals in Middle Eastern issues and, like many others, asked not to be identified because of the issue’s sensitivity.¶ AIPAC’s efforts have spurred surprisingly blunt criticism from sources that are more known for caution on such matters. The new director of the National Jewish Democratic Council, Rabbi Jack Moline, earlier this month in an interview with JTA accused AIPAC activists of using “strong-arm” tactics on uncommitted senators.¶ Douglas Bloomfield, who served as AIPAC’s legislative director in the 1980s and is now frequently critical of the group, warned that with most Democrats inclined to back Obama on this issue, the confrontational posture taken by AIPAC could wound its reputation down the road.¶ “There could be repercussions across the board with a lot of members of Congress the next time they say they want them to go to the barricades,” he said.¶ AIPAC already is taking some high-profile hits on TV, with liberal commentators accusing the lobby of trying to scuttle a diplomatic settlement with Iran.¶ “The senators from the great state of Israel are against it,” comedian Jon Stewart said last week on “The Daily Show,” accompanied by a graphic of a map of Israel emblazoned with the AIPAC logo. MSNBC host Chris Hayes said the 16 Democratic senators backing the sanctions bill are “afraid” of AIPAC.¶ Rosen said that such exposure, while irritating to AIPAC, would not be a factor in getting the lobby to shift course. More serious would be calls from donors to the group who have ties to Democrats. AIPAC’s reputation as having bipartisan support -- a critical element of its influence -- could be put at risk.¶ “AIPAC puts a premium on bipartisan consensus and maintaining communication with the White House,” said Rosen, who was fired by AIPAC in 2005 after being investigated in a government leak probe, though the resulting charges were dismissed and he later sued AIPAC unsuccessfully for damages.¶ Rosen noted AIPAC’s forthcoming policy conference in March; such conferences routinely feature a top administration official -- the president or vice president, the secretary of state or defense. At least one of these failing to appear “would be devastating to AIPAC’s image of bipartisanship,” he said.¶ A way out for the group would be to quietly negotiate a compromise behind the scenes with the White House, Rosen said.¶ “They don’t want to be seen as backing down,” he said of his former employer, “but the White House is good at helping people backing down without seeming to back down.”¶ AIPAC hardly stands alone in advocating the sanctions, said an official from another Jewish group, noting that support for the bill spanned the breadth of the community from the right-wing Zionist Organization of America to the consensus-oriented Jewish Council for Public Affairs. None of these groups, including AIPAC, wanted a confrontation, the official said.¶ "It's awkward, and the pro-Israel organizations have been looking for a way to climb down from this question,” said the official, who asked not to be identified.¶ However, the official said, the Obama administration has taken a confrontational approach. The official cited a pointed remark by National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan who suggested earlier this month that congressional backers of the sanctions legislation actually favor war with Iran and “should be up front with the American public and say so.”¶ “There seems to be a concerted effort by the White House to say we’re not going to blink," said the Jewish organizational official.

#### Cuba lobby hates the plan

**Harrison ‘3** – (D’Anna, JD Candidate at University of Houston, “Deportable Cubans in Limbo: An Issue of Immigration, Foreign Policy, or Both?” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 179, lexis)

VII. WHAT'S REALLY BEHIND THE CUBAN EMBARGO? There is no way to avoid the conclusion that money plays a huge factor in the U.S. policy toward Cuba. The embargo was originally instituted as a responsive measure after Castro and his government expropriated property owned by U.S. corporations, wealthy U.S. citizens, and wealthy Cubans. n139 Now, these wealthy Cubans, who were among the first to leave Cuba in the early 1960s, lead the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), arguably the most effective lobbying group in Washington with a virtual choke hold on U.S. policy toward Cuba. n140 The CANF's political action committee has contributed $ 27 million to federal candidates since 1982. n141 According to a study conducted by the Center for Public Integrity (CPI), Senator Robert Torricelli n142 "began receiving CANF support at about the same time he underwent a transformation from an opponent of U.S. sanctions against Cuba into one of the nation's most forceful advocates for intensifying them." n143 The CANF promoted the Helms-Burton Act and the Cuban Democracy Act, which were promulgated by Senator Torricelli. n144 In addition to its substantial [\*195] funding of members of Congress, the CANF established Radio Marti and TV Marti, the anti-communist broadcast stations aimed at Cuban audiences. n145 The CANF holds much political influence despite the fact that it represents neither the views of the majority of the Cuban-American population, nor those of the general public. n146 Part of the reason for this influence is the deep pockets of the foundation, but another part is the vacuum left by the general population's lack of interest in Cuban affairs. n147 In other words, the foundation does not have an active political opponent on issues of U.S.-Cuban relations, so it controls the issue by default. One author who is highly critical of the CANF accuses them of using intimidation, and sometimes violence, to influence policies toward Cuba. n148 This Cuban lobby is arguably so powerful that it can paralyze Congress and influence national trade policies. n149 Foreign policy is designed to represent the interests and security of the nation as a whole, not solely the interests of a political powerhouse such as CANF. n150 As a result, the United States, supposedly the model of a democratic state, falls under the control of a powerful, well-funded special interest group. Ironically, this minority represses the less-influential majority to develop policies that are supposedly designed to transform Cuba into a democratic state, rather than one ruled by a powerful minority who repress the majority view. n151 Even the American public recognizes the role that money plays in this issue. For example, one person wrote the following: "The old gripe with Cuba is just that -- old. What is the grudge based on, Russian bombs? No, that was done away with 40 years ago. It's about money, the money that U.S. companies lost when Castro took over. It is time to end the embargo." n152 Many corporations lost money when Cuba nationalized foreign-owned lands and businesses. n153 Most of these companies have absorbed the losses and continued their businesses. n154 Had the United States engaged in negotiations with Cuba instead of isolating the nation, these corporations may have [\*196] received at least partial reimbursement, like other claimants from Canada, Switzerland, France and Spain. n155 U.S. companies arguably lose more money as a result of the embargo, and would profit more if it were lifted. n156 The U.S. business community states that U.S. firms lose potential business opportunities with Cuba worth between $ 1 billion to $ 15 billion annually as a result of the embargo. n157 The attendance of numerous U.S. food products businesses at the recent exhibition in Cuba indicates that U.S. businesses support the lifting of the trade embargo. n158 Money is typically equated with power, and the Cuban situation is no exception. As was obvious in the 2000 Presidential election, Florida is a critical state to carry in order to obtain an elected political office. n159 Florida has the greatest number of Cuban-Americans, who in turn have tremendous political influence. Appealing to this group, therefore, is paramount to winning an election in Florida. Because George W. Bush won the electoral votes of Florida in 2000 by a slim margin, it is important for him to appease the highly influential Cuban-American leaders in the state. Currently, the only way to do this is to take a tough stand against Cuba through sanctions. n160

#### Deal key to prevent war

Shank and Gould 9/12 Michael Shank, Ph.D., is director of foreign policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Kate Gould is legislative associate for Middle East policy at FCNL, No Iran deal, but significant progress in Geneva, 9/12/13, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cause-conflict-conclusion/2013/nov/12/no-iran-deal-significant-progress-geneva/

Congress should welcome, not stubbornly dismiss, diplomatic efforts to finalize the interim accord and support the continued conversation to reach a more comprehensive agreement. The sanctions that hawks on the Hill are pushing derail such efforts and increase the prospects of war. ¶ There is, thankfully, a growing bipartisan contingent of Congress who recognizes that more sanctions could undercut the delicate diplomatic efforts underway. Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned early on that, “We should not at this time impose additional sanctions.” ¶ Senator Tim Johnson, D-S.D., chair of the Banking Committee, is still weighing whether to press forward with new sanctions in his committee. Separately, as early as next week, the Senate could vote on Iran sanctions amendments during the chamber’s debate on the must-pass annual defense authorization bill.¶ This caution against new sanctions, coming from these more sober quarters of the Senate, echoes the warnings from a wide spectrum of former U.S. military officials against new sanctions. There is broad recognition by U.S. and Israeli security officials that the military option is not the preferred option; a diplomatic one is. ¶ This widespread support for a negotiated solution was highlighted last week when 79 national security heavyweights signed on to a resounding endorsement of the Obama Administration’s latest diplomatic efforts.¶ Any member of Congress rejecting a diplomatic solution moves the United States toward another war in the Middle East. Saying no to this deal-in-the-works, furthermore, brings the world no closer toward the goal of Iran giving up its entire nuclear program. Rather, it would likely result in an unchecked Iranian enrichment program, while the United States and Iran would teeter perilously close on the brink of war. ¶ A deal to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran is within reach and it would be dangerous to let it slip away. Congress can do the right thing here, for America’s security and Middle East’s stability, and take the higher diplomatic road. Pandering to harsh rhetoric and campaign contributors is no way to sustain a foreign policy agenda. It will only make America and her assets abroad less secure, not more. The time is now to curb Iran’s enrichment program as well as Congress’s obstructionism to a peaceful path forward.

#### US-Iran war causes global nuclear war and collapses the global economy

Avery 11/6 John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences.¶ As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.¶ The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.¶ In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.¶ Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

## 1NC

#### The United States federal government should amend Title 22 of US Code (22 U.S.C. 6065) so that a transition government in Cuba is defined as a government that is taking appropriate steps to restitute and/or compensate United States citizens for property taken by the Cuban government, as outlined in the following addendum. The United States federal government should offer to negotiate a Bilateral Investment Treaty with Cuba that includes a Step-Down Restitution Policy.

#### We’ll insert this description of the counterplan.

#### Current language

Title 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE CHAPTER 69A-CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) SUBCHAPTER II-ASSISTANCE TO FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

§6065. Requirements and factors for determining transition government

(a) Requirements

For the purposes of this chapter, a transition government in Cuba is a government that-

(1) has legalized all political activity;

(2) has released all political prisoners and allowed for investigations of Cuban prisons by appropriate international human rights organizations;

(3) has dissolved the present Department of State Security in the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response Brigades; and

(4) has made public commitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new government-

(A) to be held in a timely manner within a period not to exceed 18 months after the transition government assumes power;

(B) with the participation of multiple independent political parties that have full access to the media on an equal basis, including (in the case of radio, television, or other telecommunications media) in terms of allotments of time for such access and the times of day such allotments are given; and

(C) to be conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers, such as the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and other election monitors;

(5) has ceased any interference with Radio Marti or Television Marti broadcasts;

(6) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable progress in-

(A) establishing an independent judiciary;

(B) respecting internationally recognized human rights and basic freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory nation;

(C) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions as set forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, and allowing the establishment of independent social, economic, and political associations;

(7) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro; and

(8) has given adequate assurances that it will allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban people.

(b) Additional factors

In addition to the requirements in subsection (a) of this section, in determining whether a transition government in Cuba is in power, the President shall take into account the extent to which that government-

(1) is demonstrably in transition from a communist totalitarian dictatorship to representative democracy;

(2) has made public commitments to, and is making demonstrable progress in-

(A) effectively guaranteeing the rights of free speech and freedom of the press, including granting permits to privately owned media and telecommunications companies to operate in Cuba;

(B) permitting the reinstatement of citizenship to Cuban-born persons returning to Cuba;

(C) assuring the right to private property; and

(D) taking appropriate steps to return to United States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for such property;

(3) has extradited or otherwise rendered to the United States all persons sought by the United States Department of Justice for crimes committed in the United States; and

(4) has permitted the deployment throughout Cuba of independent and unfettered international human rights monitors.

(Pub. L. 104–114, title II, §205, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 811.)

#### Language post-counterplan

Title 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE CHAPTER 69A-CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) SUBCHAPTER II-ASSISTANCE TO FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

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~~(Pub. L. 104–114, title II, §205, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 811.)~~

#### Setting up a Bilateral Investment Treaty as a mechanism for compensation helps Cuba meet the only condition that is keeping the embargo in place

**Mowry, ’99** (David, Senior Counsel Xerox Corporation “Lifting the Embargo against Cuba Using Vietnam as a Model: A Policy Paper for Modernity” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 25 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 229, lexis)

The obstacles that prevent a President from lifting the embargo against Cuba arbitrarily would appear to be no more than a facade of legislation. n210 If the President determines that it is prudent for the United States to once again open trade relations with Cuba, then the President may, after the appropriate reports to Congress, lift the embargo. n211 Of course the American Congress has the power to override a Presidential decree by a two-thirds majority, and it seems that no President would take such a politically volatile step without extensive consultation with, and acquiescence of, Congressional leadership. n212 Given the normalization of relations with the Communist leadership of Vietnam, America's reasons for imposing the embargo against Cuba can no longer be said to hinge on the Communist ideology of Cuba's leadership. Rather, [\*259] the final issue yet to be resolved, or discussed by the United States and Cuba, surrounds the property claims resulting from the expropriation of property during the Castro revolution. As the statutory authority, specifically LIBERTAD, suggests, the settlement of claims for property seized during the beginning of Castro's rise to power are as yet unsettled. n213 International law is made up of international custom and international agreement. n214 Only states consenting to such agreements are bound by the agreements. n215 Accepted practices among states, as well as international tribunal decisions, can give rise to international custom. n216 International law requires a state to pay full compensation for "takings" of foreign owned property. n217 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that a taking that is discriminatory, not for a public purpose, and not accompanied by "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation is unlawful. n218 The United States maintains that the property seized by Cuba was part of an expropriation program that discriminated against U.S. nationals, was not for a public purpose, and compensation that was to have been prompt, adequate, and effective, has never been paid. n219 Though there are arguments from developing nations that "full" compensation should be a relative term so as not to upset a developing economy, [\*260] international tribunals have held that full compensation is the standard under international law. n220 The issue of settling the property claims against Cuba would seem to be as simple as Cuba signing an agreement with the United States, much as Vietnam did, promising to compensate the U.S. Government and its national claimants what it owes them. n221 For Vietnam, the amount was U.S. $ 208 million, in Cuba's case the amount is approximately U.S. $ 13 billion. n222 The amount of money owed by Cuba for the takings brings about a dilemma for the United States. Cuba, in its current economic state, would not be able to pay U.S. $ 13 billion; conversely, if the U.S. Government were to settle with Cuba for an amount less than that owed, the U.S. Government could be held liable to any of the over 5000 claimants to the taken property for the difference. n223 The potential liability of the U.S. Government may be the motivation that has kept the United States from negotiating a settlement with Cuba. As Cuba's economy has continued to grow, albeit at a slow pace, there appears to be little chance that the United States could negotiate a one-time payment from Cuba for what has continued to grow to well over U.S. $ 13 billion. However, utilizing a carefully planned business investment treaty, as well as a "road map" modeled on the tactics used with Vietnam, the United States could approach Cuba with a plan that would not only satisfy the claims for taken property and avoid American liability and litigation with the former property owners, but would sufficiently bolster the Cuban economy so that full compensation could be paid over time. The U.S. statutes currently in place do not require full [\*261] compensation for taken property before the embargo against Cuba may be lifted. n224 Phase one of the "road map" with Cuba, therefore, would consist of the United States approaching Cuba with a draft BIT, n225 as well as indications that the embargo will be lifted if certain steps are followed: Cuba will have to facilitate a change in policy towards the United States and indicate a willingness, by signing the BIT, to begin compensation for the taken property, as well as a willingness to consider multiparty elections. Phase two of the "road map" would consist of the partial lifting of the embargo against Cuba by having the United States alleviate travel restrictions, and open telecommunications lines and services with Cuba. This would begin to fuel the Cuban tourism economy, and would allow Cuba to begin updating its obsolete communications technology systems. n226 Conversely, Cuba would begin payments into a central compensation fund of a set amount per year, to be determined by the two governments. These payments would be compensation for any properties that Cuba is unwilling, or unable to restore, to the former owners. Cuba would also have to hold free elections with at least one other viable political party other than the Communist party. Phase three, the final phase, would consist of the transition of Cuba's Government from a one party oligarchy to a freely elected ruling body. The United States would then lift all trade restrictions against Cuba, as per the BIT. The influx of trade from the United States would strengthen Cuba's economy sufficiently so that the graduated repayments to former owners of property in Cuba would compensate them for their losses, and the U.S. Government would not be liable for any losses. [\*262]

#### Step-Down Restitution Policy is the best mechanism --- flexibility in payment ensures appropriate and quick redress and means Cuba says yes

**Espino, ‘8** (Daniel- JD Candidate Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, President and Chairman of the Board of Puente de Jovenes Profesionales Cubanos and President of the Hispanic Law Students Association, Spring, “Step-Down Restitution: A Proposal For An Equitable Resolution To Confiscated Cuban Property” Nova Law Review, 32 Nova L. Rev. 423, lexis)

 [\*451] V. IMPLEMENTATION The Step-Down Restitution Policy should be implemented by way of a special tribunal or court established by agreement between the United States and Cuba. Such an agreement must include a provision in which both countries commit "to act in good faith so as to promote the mutual prosperity of their nations and citizens." n188 A post-Castro Cuban government must pledge to create a special court to resolve all confiscated property claims "by Cuban nationals who became nationals of the United States after the date of accrual of such claims." n189 This court will have independent and limited jurisdiction within the Cuban judicial system. n190 In implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy, a future Cuban property claims court can turn to the lessons learned in Iran and Ethiopia, where similar courts were introduced to handle confiscated property claims. n191 A. Lessons from Iran In 1982, Iran and the United States established a dedicated tribunal for the redress of property claims akin to the one needed in Cuba to implement the Step-Down Restitution Policy. n192 The need for a claims tribunal in the case of Iran was prompted by the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Forces acting in support of the Ayatollah seized not only the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, but also many privately held American assets. Correspondingly, the necessity of claims tribunals in the case of Cuba was prompted by Castro's revolution in 1959, and the still-uncompensated property seizures that went along with it. The two situations thus present similarities in terms of the emotional and political aspects of the breakdown in relations. n193 Like the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, a future Cuban property claims court implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy will have to apply law and policy in a flexible manner, granting jurisdiction over a series of claims that arise in differing circumstances, taking law and policy from various sources including Cuban and international law, and granting different redress [\*452] depending on the circumstances. n194 However, in issuing remedies, a future Cuban property claims court should do well to consider that Cuba, unlike Iran, has low-valued currency and limited or no funds with which to pay compensation claims--claims that may include payment of the value of property, interest, lost profits, and/or past unpaid rent. n195 As such, the preferred remedy of direct restitution should be granted where possible. An important lesson Cuba can learn from Iran is that "much can be done with informal structures and the good will of [the] participants." n196 Because the Step-Down Restitution Policy does not provide for the expulsion of tenants and businesses on confiscated properties, informal mediations could facilitate the settlement of property claims where the true owner simply seeks reinstitution of title and would be content with collecting rent from tenants on the property. Given the proximity of Cuba to the United States and the sizeable Cuban/Cuban American population residing in the United States, relations with Cuba and the establishment of a Cuban property claims court will not likely suffer the delays and set-backs faced in Iran given the limited cultural boundaries and understood motivations amongst the groups with interests in Cuba. n197 B. Lessons from Ethiopia The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission is another example of a property claims tribunal created by bilateral treaty. n198 While the Ethiopian Commission was given broad jurisdiction--even so far as to include tort claims--in a post war scenario, a future Cuban property claims court implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy may nevertheless find applicable case law stemming from the Ethiopian court because of their stance on confiscated property. n199 The Ethiopian Commission stated: A belligerent is bound to ensure insofar as possible that the property of protected persons is not despoiled or wasted. If private property of enemy nationals is to be frozen or otherwise impaired in wartime, it must be done by the State, and under conditions [\*453] providing for the property's protection and its eventual disposition by return to the owners or through post-war agreement. n200 Such a proclamation is at the heart of the Step-Down Restitution Policy and should be at the heart of any remediation treaty, program, or policy implemented by Cuba. VI. CONCLUSION Cuba will eventually take its first step towards the long road to a free market society. In this endeavor, Cuba should implement the Step-Down Restitution Policy as a means of achieving a prompt and efficient resolution to hundreds of thousands of property claims. The presumptive remedy of restitution will allow many Cuban exiles to take up their property and begin to make improvements to it immediately with the resources they have amassed while living elsewhere, mainly the United States. While situations may arise where former property owners find occupants currently living on the expropriated property, the Cuban government should take measures to prevent conflict between the parties and the eviction of these individuals. Given the poor housing sector, Cuba will likely have to implement legislation calling for the construction of affordable housing for Cuban Nationals living on the island currently oc-cupying confiscated property, who do not have their own confiscated property to which to return. Restitution is most appropriate for commercial properties which have undergone little or no change during the Castro regime. Given its proximity to the United States, Cuba will surely attract an enormous number of tourists from the United States and will most likely become a "stop" on the itineraries of many vacation cruise lines, like Puerto Rico and the Bahamas. With the potential for sudden interest in the country, Cuba will need to provide fast and efficient remedies to corporate claimants. With the award of direct restitution, corporate claimants may immediately use their property or alienate their property to corporations who have the resources and are ready to invest in industries such as tourism and mining. The greatest strength of restitution is the symbolism of the act. Restitution represents returning Cuba to its pre-Communist days of individual success and economic prosperity. The greatest strength of the Step-Down Restitution Policy, however, is the flexibility afforded to the fledgling democratic Cuban Government in its ability to award appropriate remedies on a case-by-case basis. With the adoption of such a policy, a healthy body of case law will quickly be established and allow for the dispensation of property claims based on differing scenarios. Although Cuba has limited land resources to offer in the form of substituted restitution, varying forms of compensation coupled with restitution or alternative remedies will allow Cuba to adequately, efficiently, and equitably handle confiscated property claims. The different types of claimants which will approach Cuba seeking restitution and the various forms of property expropriated during the Castro regime should force Cuba to avoid applying a one-size-fits-all resolution to confiscated property claims. Such a sweeping method aimed to settle all claims quickly will infuriate those on the short end of the remediation arrangement. The Step-Down Restitution Policy, with its varying remedies, allows for former owners to seek justice for Cuba's transgressions by allowing them to receive individualistic and equitable remediation.

## Multilat

#### Multilateralism fails – its unsustainable and it can’t solve anything

**Held et al, 13** – Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016) // MS

\*\*\*Edited for ablest language

Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is ~~paralyzed~~ in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below. Growing multipolarity. The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that "matter" on a given issue--that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed--has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur. Institutional inertia. The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power. Harder problems. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards--about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011). Fragmentation. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level

**No scenario for Asian wars – South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan all have the military capability to defend themselves**

**Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, 97** (Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press, doctoral candidates in political science at MIT. Harvey Sapolsky, professor of public policy at MIT. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4. Spring 1997, KONTOPOULOS)

As in Europe, the United States currently has about 100,000 military personnel stationed in Asia, all of whom should be brought home and demobilized. The United States should end its commitments to Japan and South Korea, cease military cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), withdraw from the Australia, New Zealand, United States Pact (ANZUS), and terminate the implicit guarantee to Taiwan, giving those nations new incentives to take care of themselves. No Asian ally of the United States faces an overwhelming conventional threat. It requires astounding assumptions about the relative fighting strength of North and South Korean soldiers to develop a military balance requirement for U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula. South Korea may want to improve its defenses further to replace capabilities that the United States is expected to supply – e.g., build a larger air force – but it is difficult to understand how a country with twice the population and twenty times the economic power of its primary competitor, not to mention a substantial technological lead, cannot find the resources to defend itself. Current US strategy implicitly assumes that America must remain engaged because of the Asian countries' failure to balance against Chinese strength. But Japan and Taiwan, the two plausible targets for Chinese aggression, are more than capable of defending themselves from conventional attack. Both enjoy the geographic advantage of being islands. The surrounding oceans ensure a defense dominance that could only be overcome with enormous material or technological advantages. The amphibious operations required for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or Japan would be extremely difficult and at a minimum would require substantial investment in amphibious warfare capability. Taiwan could extract a withering toll on invading forces. Its air force is large, sophisticated, and growing; its navy has deadly missile boats; and it produces anti-ship cruise missiles. The same Taiwanese forces would make a Chinese blockade of Taiwan even harder. China would find it difficult to harass Taiwanese ports on the eastern side of the island with ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.41 Chinese attacks on shipping would be blocked by Taiwan's air superiority and sea control, and Chinese blockading forces would find it difficult to cover the wide swath of ocean around Taiwan, China could use its ballistic missile force to conduct terror attacks against Taiwanese targets, but terror attacks have negligible military or long-run political effects-witness the failures of the German Blitz and of the sustained IRA bombing campaign against the United Kingdom. As long as Taiwan has access to advanced Western weapons, it will be able to defend itself, Japan's threat environment is even more benign. Its "moat" is wider than the Taiwan Strait. Japan's large, sophisticated air and naval forces give it great defensive capabilities, and air and naval warfare play directly to Japan’s technological advantage. The side with the best sensors can target the enemy first, gaining an enormous advantage; empirical evidence suggests that the better trained or technologically superior air force can achieve favorable exchange ratios of 10:1 or greater. Japan's east-coast ports would make a blockade with ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles technically impossible and would increase the area of coverage for blockading forces beyond the reasonable limits of any non-American navy's sustainment capability. Finally, anti-submarine warfare capability is a particular strength of the Japanese armed forces because of the Cold War mission for which they were designed. This sanguine analysis of the Asian military balances has not yet considered a last defensive advantage: the ability of defenders to seek balancing alliances. In a 1994 article, Gerald Segal argues that continued American military engagement in Asia is necessary because Asian nations have failed to balance Chinese power. Segal's conclusions, however, are inconsistent with the details he recounts of balancing by Asian countries whenever American military protection is absent. He reports that Vietnam has made enough progress at internal balancing to restrict the Chinese military actions in the South China Sea, and that Australia and Indonesia have made new commitments, jointly and separately, to oppose Chinese expansionism. If China sought to acquire significant power projection assets, U.S. allies could no longer afford to voice their minor disputes with each other; they would work together to contain Chinese threats.

**India’s strategic focus has changed – no risk of overreaction or war**

**Wax, 08** (Emily Wax, “Pakistan Turmoil Draws Muted Concern in India,” Washington Post, Saturday, January 19, 2008; Page A18// http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/18/AR2008011803368.html)

NEW DELHI, Jan. 18 -- They have almost always been mentioned in the same breath: India and Pakistan. For decades, the two countries have been inextricably tied in politics and in war. But analysts say that Pakistan's recent crisis has showcased the changing strategic focus in the region. As Pakistan's nuclear-armed neighbor, India is closely monitoring the political upheaval consuming its arch rival. The developments in Pakistan have implications for peace talks in the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir, and have raised fears that extremists could spill over the border. Analysts say, however, thatIndia is not nearly as worried by the crisis as it might have been in the past. With a fast-growing economy, India is the world's largest democracy and sees itself as an emerging superpower. Its new obsession is China, with which it has a hugely important trading relationship. "India is concerned about Pakistan, but not alarmed. The two countries have been completely de-hyphenated," said K. Santhanam, a defense expert in New Delhi. "There are many other things that are happening in India. Kashmir's violence has gone down. India's priority is economic now. The dynamic has really changed." In recent days, newspaper coverage in India has been dominated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Beijing; Pakistan's elections next month have received scant mention. After the assassination of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto last month, India's stock market sank and train service to Pakistan was suspended out of security concerns. But the market bounced back in a matter of hours, and trains were in service again within days. India and Pakistan have fought three wars with each other, and their arms race set off international alarm in the late 1990s. In 2001, they reached the brink of war over an attack on the Indian Parliament that was blamed on Pakistan-backed militants. "But it's all about China now," said VirSanghvi, a popular columnist with the Hindustan Times. "After Bhutto was killed, the Indian government didn't mobilize troops or do anything dramatic. The reaction was tempered and thoughtful. These days India only worries about Pakistan if there is a cricket match or a terrorist attack. That's the new reality."

**India-Pakistan war won’t happen—nuclear deterrence solves**

**Malik, 03** (Mohan, The Stability Of Nuclear Deterrence In South Asia, Asian Affairs, Fall, KONTOPOULOS)

The presence of nuclear weapons certainly makes states exceedingly cautious, notable examples are China and Pakistan's postrudear behavior The consequences of a nuclear war are elooho^endojslocwiierroUie Policymakers in New Delhi and Isamabad have a sound understanding of each other's capabiltes. mentions, polices, and. more important, red lines, which they are careful not to cross This repeatedly has Deer de~\*onst-ated since the late 1980s. Despite the 1999 Kargil War and the post-Septembc 11 bnnkmanship that illustrate the "stabilly-instab lit/ paradox thai nuclear weapons have introduced to the equation in South Asia.23 proponents of nuclear deterrence in -,l.-r,.fceiflT; \e\* "-rlr- ce'irve wt nuclear deterrence is working to prevent war in the region. Th-y coin to the 'act that rehire-the 1999 <argi conflict no- the post-September I' miliary sartdof esca ated beyond a limited conventional engagement due to the threat o' nuclear war So the stability argument is based on the reasonable cendusion that nuclear weapons have served an Important purpose in the sense that India and Pakstan have not gore x an a l-out war since 1971 24 just as rue ear deterrence maintained stabilty between the United States and the USSR during the cold war, so l can induce s~ If r stabilizing effects in South .Asia. Regarding the technica1 requirements of slab'e deterrence, questions about command, control, and safety procedures continue to be raised Bo\* Pakistan and India claim to have maintained tighter controls over their arsenal-rt is not in their own interests to see anestale actors ganng control of nudear technology Both India and Pakistan publicly have declared moratoriums on funher nudear tests, and India's adherence to no-first-use (NFU) posture and confidence-building measures such as pre-notification of missile tests and an agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear installations promotes crisis stability. Devin Hegarty argues that this is respons&e behavior in staA contrast to U.S.-Soviet nudear options nduding 'deoloymen: of ters of thousands of nudear warheads bombers flying on 24-hour alert status and the nuclear safety lapses that characterized the superpower arms race '25 Pott-September 11 measures to promote greater securty and cont'd over nudear weapons and materials have been accorded the toomost priority India's nuclear arsenal is firmly under the control of civilian leadership, and the Pakistani army always has retained the real authority over its country's nuclear weapons regard«ss of who is head of state. Pakistan's military chain of command appears intact despite internal tu'moil and "eshuflirg at the top of the government 26 The United States reportedly is considering offering assistance to ensure the physical protection o\* sensitive nudear assets with vaults, sensors, alarms, tamperproof seals and labels and other means of protection, ensunng pe\*sornel reliability and secure transport of sensitwe items.27

## Transition

#### **Your ev cites tons of other hotspots that you don’t solve**

David **Bosco** **1AC author 2006** (a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine) July 2006 “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_>

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. ¶ This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. ¶ Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. ¶ Consider the following scenarios: ¶ Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. ¶ Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. ¶ Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. ¶ The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. ¶ As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? ¶ The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored.¶ But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang?¶ Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II.

# 2NC

## Multilateralism

#### Multilat not coming & multiple alt causes

Multilat not coming due to china rise/power shift to China as well as weak international institutions (those are required yo)
alt causes:
1) decentralized power makes coop difficult
2) limits of capitalism/ differences internationally regarding globalization (not resolved w/ embargo lol)
3) ineffective leaders bc changing political times (ie low approval ratings)
4) governments in general cannot deal effectively with foreign relations (snowden is a g8 example)

Lodhi 1/21 [Dr Maleeha Lodhi, special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK, January 21, 2014, “Power in a changing world”, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-227611-Power-in-a-changing-world]

Much conference discussion inevitably revolved around questions about whether the world was moving in a multipolar or nonpolar direction. Some argued there would be three sets of economic poles in the future: US, China and the European Union. Others saw the Sino-US balance of power as the defining trend.¶ In my intervention I argued that as the power shift from the West to China continues to gather pace, how this global transition is managed will be a key determinant of international stability, especially as calculations will be more difficult for countries to make in a setting of decentralised power where the modalities of exercising power will also be more complex.¶ Others raised the question of what China’s rise would mean. One speaker made several trenchant observations about why discussion of this often ends not with a conclusion, but with a question: how will China behave? Is this due to a subconscious desire in the West not to see a non-democratic country succeed at a time when the West itself is mired in self-doubt? ¶ Is there a connection, he asked, between ‘fear of China’ and weakening of the democratic ideal in the West, indicated by declining interest and participation in politics. Such questioning also reflected implicit admiration by the West of China’s ability to think, plan and act long-term, while Western democracies remained gridlocked and often at the mercy of special interests. Is fear of China more a critique of the state of affairs in the West than of China’s conduct?¶ In another session the long term forces shaping the global future were identified by a speaker as: 1) the limits of capitalism and the fact that globalisation doesn’t always work for everyone; 2) leaders are increasingly ineffective because traditional levers of power do not work in an environment marked by power diffusion and rise of new actors. This is reflected in the low public ratings that political leaders receive in opinion surveys; and 3) shortcomings of the present systems of governance to live up to current challenges and manage tomorrow’s world.¶ The related themes of empowerment of individuals and diminishing state capacity echoed in most sessions. As did the ‘expectations gap’. Popular protests across the world, from Greece and Turkey to Brazil, all urge the need for governments to rearrange relations with their citizens and perform more competently to meet public demands. ¶ There was agreement that a more multipolar world required multilateral institutions to be strengthened, even reconfigured. But concern was voiced about the lack of international consensus on how to do this. From this it was concluded that the present weaknesses of the multilateral system are likely to continue.

## Transition

#### Multiple alternate causalities to disease

**Brower, 03** (Jennifer, science/technology policy analyst, and Peter Chalk, political scientist, Summer 2003, Rand Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, “Vectors Without Borders,” <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/vectors.html>)

This year's outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Beijing, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Toronto is only one of the more recent examples of the challenge posed by infectious diseases. Highly resilient varieties of age-old ailments— as well as virulent emerging pathogens—are now prevalent throughout the world. These illnesses include cholera, pneumonia, malaria, and dysentery in the former case and Legionnaires' disease, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), Ebola, and SARS in the latter. In the United States, West Nile virus entered New York in 2000 and then spread to 44 states by 2002, and monkey pox struck the Midwest this June. In the latter half of the 20th century, almost 30 new human diseases were identified. The spread of several of them has been expedited by the growth of antibiotic and drug resistance. Globalization, modern medical practices, urbanization, climate change, sexual promiscuity, intravenous drug use, and acts of bioterrorism further increase the likelihood that people will come into contact with potentially fatal diseases.

## DA

#### We control time frame and magnitude – deal failure draws in global powers and goes nuclear within months

PressTV 11/13

Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail, 11/13/13, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.

#### Turns multilat – Secondary sanctions on Iran undermine US leadership-collapses global rules based international order

Leverett, 12 – professor at Pennsylvania State University's School of International Affairs (7/5, “America’s Iran Policy and the Undermining of International Order”, <http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=3490>)//VP

Second, secondary sanctions are a political house of cards. American officials are well aware of their presumptive illegality. Successive U.S. administrations have been reluctant to impose them on non-U.S. entities transacting with Iran, precisely to avoid formal challenges at the WTO. U.S. secondary sanctions are, in effect, an enormous bluff, leveraging the specter of legal and reputational risk in America to bully companies and banks in third countries to stop transacting with Iran, but without pulling the trigger on the threat to punish those that continue doing business in Iran. The UK and European sanctions now facing legal challenges are a product of this bullying campaign. For over a decade, the EU has condemned America’s threatened ‘extraterritorial’ application of national trade law, warning it would go to the WTO if Washington ever sanctioned European companies over Iran-related business. Over the last several years, though, enough British and European businesses stopped transacting with Iran that the EU was no longer under pressure to defend European commercial interests and could begin subordinating its Iran policy to American preferences. By last year, it has imposed a nearly comprehensive economic embargo against the Islamic Republic. While Europe has surrendered on having an independent Iran policy, the U.S. bluff on secondary sanctions will soon be called, most likely by China. To be sure, Beijing does not seek confrontation with America over Iran, and has sought to accommodate Washington in many ways—e.g., by not developing trade and investment positions in the Islamic Republic as rapidly as it might have, and by shifting some Iran-related transactional flows into renminbi to help the Obama administration avoid sanctioning Chinese banks. While China’s imports of Iranian oil appear, in the aggregate, to be growing, Beijing reduces them when the administration is deciding about six-month sanctions waivers for countries buying Iranian crude. The Obama administration, for its part, continues giving China sanctions waivers; the one Chinese bank barred from America for Iran-related transactions is a Chinese energy company subsidiary with no U.S. business. But as Congress legislates more secondary sanctions, Obama’s room to maneuver is shrinking. Obama will soon be in the position of demanding that China cut Iranian oil imports in ways that would harm its economy, and that Chinese banks stop virtually all Iran-related transactions. Beijing will not be able to accommodate such radical demands; it will have to say ‘no’, putting Obama in a classic lose-lose situation. “If America wants a nuclear deal grounded in the NPT, Hassan Rohani is an ideal interlocutor. But this would require Washington to bring its own policy in line with the NPT.” Obama could retreat. But then the world will know that secondary sanctions are a bluff, undercutting their deterrent effect. Alternatively, he could sanction major Chinese firms and banks. But that will force Beijing to respond—at least by taking America to the WTO (where China will win), perhaps by retaliating against U.S. companies. At this point, Beijing has more ways to impose costs on America for violations of international economic law impinging on Chinese interests than Washington has levers to coerce Chinese compliance with U.S. policy preferences. America and its partners will not come out ahead in this scenario. Third, U.S. secondary sanctions accelerate the shift of economic power from West to East. As non-Western economies surpass more Western countries in their relative importance to the global economy, America has a strong interest in keeping non-Western states tied to established, U.S.-dominated mechanisms for conducting, financing, and settling international transactions. Secondary sanctions, though, push in the opposite direction, incentivizing emerging powers to speed up development of non-Western alternatives to existing transactional platforms. “Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions—not because of Iranian surrender (which won’t be forthcoming), but because they delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs.” This trend will diminish Western influence in myriad ways—e.g., reducing the dollar’s role as a transactional currency, lowering the share of cross-border commodity trades on New York and London exchanges, and shrinking the global near-monopoly of Western-based reinsurance companies and P&I clubs. Add the cost of a U.S.-instigated trade dust-up with China, and the self-damaging quality of America’s dysfunctional Iran policy becomes even clearer. Finding a New Approach Putting America on a better strategic trajectory will take thoroughgoing revision of its Iran policy. In this regard, the election of Hassan Rohani—who ran the Islamic Republic’s Supreme National Security Council for sixteen years, was its chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-2005, and holds advanced degrees in Islamic law and civil law—as Iran’s next president is an opportunity. If America wants a nuclear deal grounded in the NPT, Rohani is an ideal interlocutor. But this would require Washington to bring its own policy in line with the NPT—first of all, by acknowledging Iran’s right to safeguarded enrichment. Strategic recovery will also entail reversing Washington’s reliance on secondary sanctions—not because of Iranian surrender (which won’t be forthcoming), but because they delegitimize America’s claim to continuing leadership in international economic affairs. This, however, is even more difficult than revising the U.S. position on Iranian enrichment—for Congress has legislated conditions for lifting sanctions that stipulate Iran’s abandonment of all alleged WMD activities, cutting all ties to those Washington deems terrorists, and political transformation. Overcoming this will require Obama to do what President Nixon did to enable America’s historic breakthrough with China—going to Tehran, strategically if not physically, to accept a previously demonised political order as a legitimate entity representing legitimate national interests. None of this is particularly likely. But if America doesn’t do these things, it condemns itself to a future as an increasingly failing, and flailing, superpower—and as an obstacle, rather than a facilitator, of rules-based international order.

#### DA Destroys the world economy

**Phillips. 06** (Phillips Research Fellow for Middle East­ern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud­ies, at The Heritage Foundation, 06 James, June 2, “U.S. Policy and Iran’s Nuclear Challenge” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iran/hl942.cfm>)//VP

There is no guaranteed policy that can halt the Iranian nuclear program short of war, and even a military campaign may only delay Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. But U.S. policy­making regarding the Iranian nuclear issue inevita­bly boils down to a search for the least-bad option. And as potentially costly and risky as a preventive war against Iran would be, allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would result in far heavier poten­tial costs and risks. The U.S. probably would be able to deter Iran from a direct nuclear attack on American or Israeli targets by threatening massive retaliation and the assured destruction of the Iranian regime. But there is a lingering doubt that a leader such as President Ahmadinejad, who reportedly harbors apocalyptic religious beliefs, would have the same cost-benefit calculus about a nuclear war as other leaders. The bellicose leader, who boldly called for Israel to be “wiped off the map” before he acquired a nuclear weapon, might be sorely tempted to follow through on his threat after he acquired one. Moreover, his regime might risk passing nuclear weapons off to terrorist surrogates in hopes of escaping retaliation for a nuclear surprise attack launched by an unknown attacker. Even if Iran could be deterred from considering such attacks, an Iranian nuclear breakout would undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Algeria to build or acquire their own nuclear weap­ons. Each new nuclear power would multiply the risks and uncertainties in an already volatile region. Iran also may be emboldened to step up its sup­port of terrorism and subversion, calculating that its nuclear capability would deter a military response. An Iranian miscalculation could easily lead to a future military clash with the United States or an American ally that would impose expo­nentially higher costs than a war with a non-nucle­ar Iran. Even if it could not threaten a nuclear missile attack on U.S. territory for many years, Tehran could credibly threaten to target the Saudi oil fields with a nuclear weapon, thereby gaining a potent blackmail threat over the world economy.

#### 1) Iran sanctions won’t pass now – continued pressure from Obama is key

**Bowman 1/24/14-** Senate correspondent at Voice of America (Michael, “Support Slipping for Iran Sanctions in US Senate”, 1/24/14, <http://www.payvand.com/news/14/jan/1172.html>) //CW

CAPITOL HILL - More Democratic senators are quietly signaling their opposition to a bill that spells out new sanctions against Iran if negotiations to limit the country's nuclear program do not yield a final accord. **The bill retains bipartisan support in both houses of Congress, but passage is seen as increasingly unlikely in the Democratic-led Senate** **amid an intense lobbying effort by the Obama administration to hold off on sanctions while international negotiations proceed.** Senators Patty Murray and Elizabeth Warren are the latest Democrats to announce their opposition to the Iran sanctions bill currently before Congress. In a letter to constituents in Washington state, Murray said **"the administration should be given time to negotiate a strong verifiable comprehensive agreement" on Iran's nuclear program**. At the same time, she pledged to work "to swiftly enact sanctions" if the talks ultimately fail. Similarly, a spokeswoman for Warren says the Massachusetts senator "does not support imposing additional sanctions through new legislation while diplomatic efforts to achieve a long-term agreement are ongoing." The sanctions bill has 16 Democratic co-sponsors, near-unanimous support among Republicans, and the backing of politically potent pro-Israeli U.S. lobbying groups. **But 11 Senate committee chairs, including Murray, currently oppose the bill.** Among Democrats who signed on to the measure late last year, some have grown less vocal in their defense and promotion of the measure in recent weeks. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has neither explicitly promised a vote on the bill, nor ruled it out. Congressional expert William Galston of the Brookings Institution **says pressure from President Barack Obama appears to be swaying a growing number of Democratic lawmakers.**"The White House is determined to prevent this from happening," he said. "The administration believes in the marrow of its bones that the executive branch is the lead negotiator in the matter and that it deserves a chance to conduct its own foreign policy." **Iran says any new sanctions would violate last year's interim nuclear accord and spell the end of negotiations.**

**2) The Cuba lobby will block the plan – it costs capital to get past it**

**LeoGrande, 13 -** professor in the department of government at American University's School of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C.(William, “The Cuba Lobby” Foreign Policy, 4/11,

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/11/the_cuba_lobby_jay_z>

Today, U.S. relations with Latin America are suffering from an equally irrational policy toward Cuba -- a policy designed in the 1960s to overthrow Fidel Castro's government and which, more than 50 years later, is no closer to success. Like U.S. policy toward China in the 1950s and 1960s, policy toward Cuba is frozen in place by a domestic political lobby, this one with roots in the electorally pivotal state of Florida. The Cuba Lobby combines the carrot of political money with the stick of political denunciation to keep wavering Congress members, government bureaucrats, and even presidents in line behind a policy that, as President Barack Obama himself admits, has failed for half a century and is supported by virtually no other countries. (The last time it came to a vote in the U.N. General Assembly, only Israel and the Pacific island of Palau sided with the United States.) Of course, the news at this point is not that a Cuba Lobby exists, but that it astonishingly lives on -- even during the presidency of Obama, who publicly vowed to pursue a new approach to Cuba, but whose policy has been stymied thus far. Like the China Lobby, the Cuba Lobby isn't one organization but a loose-knit conglomerate of exiles, sympathetic members of Congress, and nongovernmental organizations, some of which comprise a self-interested industry nourished by the flow of "democracy promotion" money from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). And like its Sino-obsessed predecessor, the Cuba Lobby was launched at the instigation of conservative Republicans in government who needed outside backers to advance their partisan policy aims. In the 1950s, they were Republican members of Congress battling New Dealers in the Truman administration over Asia policy. In the 1980s, they were officials in Ronald Reagan's administration battling congressional Democrats over Central America policy. At the Cuba Lobby's request, Reagan created Radio Martí, modeled on Radio Free Europe, to broadcast propaganda to Cuba. He named Jorge Mas Canosa, founder of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), to chair the radio's oversight board. President George H.W. Bush followed with TV Martí. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.) authored the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, writing the economic embargo into law so no president could change it without congressional approval. Founded at the suggestion of Richard V. Allen, Reagan's first national security advisor, CANF became one of the most powerful ethnic foreign-policy organizations in the United States and was the linchpin of the Cuba Lobby until Mas Canosa's death in 1997. "No individual had more influence over United States policies toward Cuba over the past two decades than Jorge Mas Canosa," the New York Times editorialized. In Washington, CANF built its reputation by spreading campaign contributions to bolster friends and punish enemies. In 1988, CANF money helped Joe Lieberman defeat incumbent Sen. Lowell Weicker, whom Lieberman accused of being soft on Castro because he visited Cuba and advocated better relations. Weicker's defeat sent a chilling message to other members of Congress: challenge the Cuba Lobby at your peril. In 1992, according to Peter Stone's reporting in National Journal, New Jersey Democrat Sen. Robert Torricelli, seduced by the Cuba Lobby's political money, reversed his position on Havana and wrote the Cuban Democracy Act, tightening the embargo. Today, the political action arm of the Cuba Lobby is the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, which hands out more campaign dollars than CANF's political action arm did even at its height -- more than $3 million in the last five national elections.

**democrats don’t like it and it is high visibility**

**LeoGrande, 13** – is a professor in the department of government at American University's School of Public Affairs (William, “The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After Chavez”, 02 Apr 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-of-dependence-cubas-foreign-policy-after-chavez)//eek

But the momentum in Washington soon dissipated in the face of more pressing foreign policy priorities, opposition from Congress, even among some Democrats, and resistance from an inertial State Department bureaucracy more comfortable with the familiar policy of the past -- its failure notwithstanding -- than the risk of trying something new. As a former senior State Department official explained, high-visibility foreign policy changes of this magnitude only happen if the president demands that they happen, and Obama's attention was focused elsewhere. In December 2009, Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a consultant for the U.S. Agency for International Development's "democracy promotion" programs, brought all progress to a halt. At the end of Obama's first term, relations with Cuba were not much better than at the start.

#### Negotiations will be successful – no derailment from allies or Congress

Kinzer 1/6

Stephen, former New York Times foreign correspondent who has covered more than 50 countries on five continents, US-Iran detente will be biggest geopolitical story of 2014, 1/6/14, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/1/us-iran-detente-.html

In the end, crazies on both sides will fail. Key figures in Tehran and Washington will have no choice but to recognize that reconciliation will bring enormous strategic benefits. It is a classic win-win situation. Iran finds a way out of its isolation and an escape from crushing sanctions. The United States guarantees a nuclear-weapon-free Iran and gains a potentially valuable partner in the fight against radical Sunni insurgents in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ Not to be underestimated in the Washington debate is the influence of U.S. corporations, which see enormous opportunities in Iran. Oil companies would be obvious beneficiaries of reconciliation. Aerospace companies are salivating at the prospect of a large nation whose airplanes are in need of replacement. The pharmaceutical industry sees great possibilities in Iran because of its booming market and lack of specialized medicines. All are quietly lobbying for normalization.¶ Outrage over the prospect of U.S.-Iran reconciliation is based largely on emotion. Iran and the United States have inflicted terrible blows on each other, and the legacy of this history has proved maddeningly difficult to overcome. In 2014 the anger these countries feel toward each other will be moderated by strategic logic.¶ Saudi Arabia and Israel are working intently to block this peace process. Many of the members of Congress who bloviated at the Foreign Affairs Committee hearing sounded as if they were reading index cards prepared by pro-Israel lobbyists. This is the beginning of a major campaign in Washington aimed at blocking a U.S.-Iran deal. It will be highly reminiscent of efforts to block reconciliation between the U.S. and China 40 years ago and will fail, just as those efforts did.¶ When the U.S. shocked the world by extending a hand of friendship to China, two important American allies became suddenly apoplectic. Japan was terrified, and Taiwan entered panic mode. A series of reassurances, including a strengthened U.S. military commitment to Taiwan, did not resolve these doubts but allowed the United States to proceed in spite of them.¶ China in the 1970s was in a situation comparable to Iran’s today: marginalized from the world system despite its size, history, culture and influence. Such isolation is always destabilizing, since — as President Lyndon Johnson memorably said, it is always better to have a rival “inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in.”¶ Japan and Taiwan have seen that their fears of China’s emergence from isolation were unwarranted. Will Saudi Arabia and Israel follow the same path, ultimately recognizing that Iran’s return to normality might not be so bad and could even have benefits? Saudi Arabia is too trapped in its narrow paradigm to take advantage of regional shifts. Israel may be more adroit. It has a long history of cooperation with Iran, and strategic logic dictates that this resume.¶ Despite their evident differences, Israel and Iran are logical partners. They have cooperated fitfully over the years, most recently in the 1980s, when they faced common enemies in Iraq and the Soviet Union. Today they both view Sunni radicalism as a major threat. They share a deep suspicion of Arabs. If 2014 does indeed turn out to be the year the United States begins dealing normally with Iran, Israel could follow — but probably only in the post-Netanyahu era.¶ Imagining the future of Middle East politics after a U.S.-Iran rapprochement is tantalizing. First, however, the current interim accord — signed not just by the United States and Iran but also by Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China — must be transformed into a long-term treaty that will end Western sanctions and guarantee that Iran never produces nuclear weapons. Decisive progress will be made toward such a treaty in 2014. Enemies of peace in Tehran and Washington will not be able to derail it.

#### Top of the docket but capital key

Rothkopf 11/12 David, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, This Deal Won’t Seal Itself, 11/12/13, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/12/this\_deal\_won\_t\_seal\_itself\_obama\_nuclear\_talks\_iran

No, even the Iranians should be happy with the delay... and not just for the cynical reason that any delay buys them the time they want and need to advance their nuclear weapons program. They also very much want sanctions relief, and to get it, they need the deal to win support from the U.S. Congress. Given the efforts of multiple forces to block the deal, this will mean the Obama administration and the president himself will have to systematically engage opponents in a way they seldom do on anything. Winning support on Capitol Hill and with the American people for such a deal is potentially the president's next big domestic political test. Failure on this after the failure to win support for his Syria efforts, the blowback from the NSA scandal, and his unsteady and confusing Egypt policies would be a big setback for the president during his second term, a period in which chief executives often turn to foreign policy to shape their legacies.¶ Of central concern to those domestic and international skeptics and opponents of any kind of rapprochement with Iran will be how the administration will ensure any deal is being adhered to and whether they have the resolve to punish Iran for any missteps or misrepresentations. If the President and his team can make a compelling case that they do, and then such a deal is certainly a risk worth taking. However, if the deal is seen as a dodge, as a way to avoid testing the president's resolve to do whatever is necessary to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, or even as a way to simply punt the hard questions associated with Iranian nukes to the next Oval Office occupant, then few will or should support what would amount to simply papering over one of the Middle East's great problems.¶ In short, the most critical component of this deal is not the words drafted by diplomats but what lies in the heart of the Iranians and the president of the United States. If Iran reverses past patterns and actually complies, the deal could be part of a game-changing reduction of tension that all in the region should welcome. But because that is a change without precedent and one that goes against the grain of decades' worth of Iranian behavior, as well as the character and commitment of the president of the United States, it is even more important to its success. If the Iranians believe President Obama is resolved to enforce it swiftly and decisively, it may work. If they think he will be reluctant to take tough enforcement measures, if they think he can be played -- either because he wants the legacy of an apparently successful deal or because he simply is loath to run the risk of costly, dangerous military action against Iran -- then history suggests they will play him (much as past U.S. leaders have been played in other such "deals" as was the case with North Korea).

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## CP

#### 1. Education --- debate about the process of economic interaction with cuba is key.

**Mowry**, Senior Counsel Xerox Corporation, **’99** (David, “Lifting the Embargo against Cuba Using Vietnam as a Model: A Policy Paper for Modernity” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 25 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 229, lexis)

VI. Implementing Steps From the U.S./Vietnamese Agreement To End the Embargo Against Cuba. In 1996, the United Nations voted 137-3 for a resolution calling for an end to the Cuban embargo by the United States. n144 Such a strong vote signified that the thirty-year embargo has not carried favor with the rest of the world. The advent of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (LIBERTAD) has not helped matters. n145 The attempt by the United States to proclaim through legislation that foreign investment in Cuba will have negative repercussions clearly represents a minority voice in the world today. n146 As one scholar notes, "the United States is the only major country that is not involved in the expansion of foreign investment in Cuba." n147 Currently, the question seems not to be whether the United States should lift the embargo against Cuba, but rather when and how the embargo will be lifted. The proposition may not be a simple one given that the United States has invested over three decades in a hard-line "full restitution or nothing" stance with Cuba. n148 However, the difficulties involved in the [\*250] lifting of the embargo should in no way deter the United States and Cuba from negotiating a BIT that would be profitable and comfortable for both nations. Lifting the embargo as it stands today, with a multitude of statutes and regulations concerning its continuation and/or lifting, may not be as simple an issue as the lifting of the embargo against Vietnam. But an exploration of the practical steps necessary to lifting it reveals that the embargo against Cuba, if not the political repercussions, could be eliminated within one year after both countries begin to move toward issue settlement. This final section will examine the steps used by Vietnam and the United States to bring an end to the tensions between their governments, and how some of those same steps should be taken by the United States and Cuba.

#### Normalization is different than normalize – the counterplan may be part of the process of normalization, but the plan text says they normalize relations which mandate zero sanctions remain in the plan

**Pfister**, now a Professor of Communications at University of Nebraska-Lincoln, **and Jarvis, ’99** (Damien and Jason, last date cited, “Normalization Topic Wording Paper” http://debate.uvm.edu/wppfister.html)

In the foreign policy literature concerning pariah states, "normalize" is used often. Literally, it means, "to make normal," and this is how scholars in the field utilize the word. The trick with crafting a resolution utilizing "normalize" is, of course, the division of ground. Many scholars indicate anything that makes relations "more normal," for example, humanitarian assistance, trade agreements, etc, is a "normalization" of relations. This would make negative ground more difficult to predict, as "normalization" would be similar to "change" with a direction. However, the verb form of normalization, normalize, might solve many of these problems since it suggests a particular goal and end point within the context of a specific policy. Affirmatives would be forced to create a policy that "normalizes" relations, rather than merely advocate a policy that falls under the purview of a process of normalization. As the definitions section below explains, normalize suggests an endpoint reached in which relations are "normal." This definition might prevent affirmatives from lifting just one economic sanction, since that action would leave other economic sanctions in place, and thus not be "normal" economic relations. The contextual definitions lend credence to this interpretation.

#### substantial means without material qualification but the counterplan materially qualifies the normalization of relations on compensation being provided –

**That’s Black’s Law 91** [p. 1024]

Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.

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#### It’s not a conditions counterplan, it’s a sequenced engagement counterplan --- the CP signals US goodwill that brings Cuba back to the table

**Meacham, ‘9** (Carl, Senior Adviser Latin America and the Caribbean for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 23, “Changing Cuba Policy - in the United States National Interest” Staff Trip Report, https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009\_rpt/cuba.pdf

The regime appears to be open to some bilateral dialogue and cooperation Staff's meetings with GOC officials revealed stark differences between Cuban and U.S. priorities in bilateral relations. Most of the U.S. policy reforms that are proposed in Washington center on liberalizing travel to the island, yet the GOC considers travel to be a domestic issue for the United States and therefore of less relevance to bilateral discussions. Most importantly, the GOC views the USG's emphasis on conditionality (i.e., lifting U.S. economic sanctions in return for concrete movement toward democracy) as an unlikely starting point for future negotiations. When staff asked GOC officials about the human rights situation and the plight of Cuban dissidents, GOC officials countered with Guantanamo,\8\ Abu Ghraib, and the case of the ``Cuban Five.'' \9\ When staff asked about what gestures the Cuban government would find positive, officials expressed concerns with programs by USAID intended to facilitate a transition to democracy in Cuba as well as Radio and TV Marti broadcasts from Miami, which are intended to provide an alternative source of information for the Cuban people. They view these programs as interventionist tools of the United States intended to bring about regime change. On issues of national security and commerce, however, the GOC indicated a willingness to cooperate with the United States where mutual interests exist, echoing previous statements by Raul Castro on his desire for dialogue with the USG. Since assuming power in 2006, he has made several overtures to engage in dialogue with the United States with the condition that the dialogue is based on the principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.\10\ According to State Department sources, the USG has also made overtures over the last 18 months to discuss narco-trafficking and current restrictions on travel for diplomats in Havana and Washington, but these efforts have proven unsuccessful thus far. Recommendatons According to a recently published book on U.S. policy towards Cuba, only three avenues of regular official communication exist with the GOC: monthly meetings between U.S. and Cuban military officers at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, occasional cooperation between the U.S. and Cuban coast guards on drug enforcement and migration matters (through a U.S. Coast Guard attache at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana), and frequent contact between U.S. and Cuban meteorologists who track hurricanes in the Caribbean.\11\ Given these precedents and the current state of U.S.-Cuban relations, staff concluded that progress could be attained by replacing conditionality with sequenced engagement, beginning with narrow areas of consensus that develop trust. A steady series of gradual measures has significant confidence-building potential and could ultimately create the conditions for effective dialogue over more contentious issues. By sequencing this process of engagement with Cuba, the USG would have the opportunity to continually reassess progress towards the advancement of national interests. In other words, a pragmatic, phased approach would allow the USG to halt the engagement process at any point if U.S. interests were no longer being served. Staff recommends assessing the viability of reinstating discussions on drug interdiction and migration, and incremental steps in other areas, in order to address issues of concern for both countries. These measures should build upon each other to establish new foundations for dialogue. Initially, increased communication and cooperation between the GOC and USG can take place within the framework of the existing embargo, though staff suggests consideration of several exceptions to U.S. sanctions as talks progress, as detailed below.

#### Cuba already wants the counterplan, the problem is the US saying no --- the counterplan is the US saying yes.

**Ashby, ’11** (Timothy- Deputy Assistant Secretary Western Hemisphere for the Department of Commerce, Director of the Office of Mexico and the Caribbean for the U.S. Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration and Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, November 22, “Helping Cuban Reforms Through Agricultural Trade” http://www.coha.org/helping-cuban-reforms-through-agricultural-trade/)

The President retains ultimate decision-making authority as to which countries and products are eligible for GSP status. There are certain mandatory criteria that countries must measure up to in order to be considered eligible for GSP treatment. Of particular interest with respect to Cuba, communist countries are not eligible for GSP treatment “unless the country receives Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status , is a World Trade Organization (WTO) member and a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and is not dominated by international communism.”[1] In addition, a GSP beneficiary “may not have nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized property of U.S. citizens or corporations without providing, or taking steps to provide, prompt, adequate and effective compensation, or submitting such issues to a mutually agreed forum for arbitration.”[2] While certain products from Cuba would certainly be eligible for GSP status, the mandatory country requirements present additional hurdles for preferential trade treatment for Havana to qualify outside of the current political climate. However, these are not insurmountable. For example, Cuba repeatedly has offered to negotiate the settlement of claims for expropriated U.S. property, and since the demise of the Soviet Union, could not be considered to be dominated by “international communism”.

#### That momentum is likely to increase

**Santiago**, Attorney at American Tower Corporation, **2K** (Rolando, Spring, “Y2K, The Millennium for a Revised U.S.-Cuba Trade Policy: Grounds For Removing the Embargo” NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 169, lexis)

The following is the text of an impassioned statement delivered on May 7, 1999, by Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-Fl.) before the Trade Subcommittee of the House of Representative's Ways and Means Committee discussing the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and why the China model is an inadequate example for justifying a lifting of the embargo. Congressman Balart highlights some very insightful and astute facts regarding why the Cuba dynamic cannot be treated with the same policies as those used with China: [\*191] Despite the intensification of the campaign to save the tyranny, I feel more certain everyday that Cuba will be free. A national consensus in favor of multiparty democracy becomes apparent more clearly and more strongly every day in Cuba, and that consensus in favor of liberty contains within it a firm rejection of tyranny and oppression. It is only a matter of time until the necessary dynamic is achieved that will permit the Cuban people to put an end to the tyranny and recover their sovereignty through free elections. The tyranny is obviously preparing for the time when Castro will die. We can see clear signs of its intention to name someone like Alarcon or Lage as chief of state, probably with Raul Castro as head of the armed forces. These maneuvers will be accompanied by offers to return previously-confiscated property to Americans, all for the purpose of Creating increasing pressure for Congress to lift the embargo in order to be able to establish and consolidate a fascist system in Cuba like the one that exists today in Mainland China (the "Chinese Model"). The Chinese Model in Cuba would mean a long-term consolidation of slavery for Cubans. We should always remember that capitalism is not synonymous with democracy or liberty; examples in this century abound (Mussolini, Hitler, Trujillo, etc.). Capitalism, although without a doubt the most effective means of creating wealth, is perfectly compatible with oppression. It is also perfectly compatible with democracy and liberty, but the mere fact that capitalism exists does not guarantee the development of liberty or its consolidation. Although it is clear that the establishment of a true Chinese Model will not be possible in Cuba during Fidel Castro's rule (since that system requires a certain decentralization of power and other characteristics that the tyrant will never permit), its establishment is theoretically possible when the tyrant dies. And the tyranny is preparing for its establishment. With that purpose it will make tempting offers to international capitalism to try to again its support for the Chinese Model, a system which would permit the continuation of the conditions of misery, humiliation and oppression which Cubans face today. The decisive struggle of the Cuban people, therefore, will be to avoid the establishment of the Chinese political and economic model in Cuba after Fidel Castro's death and to achieve the return of sovereignty to the people through free elections. It is essential to realize that establishment of the Chinese Model in Cuba is not possible as long as the American embargo exists. Without access to the American market, a Chinese Model permitting the consolidation of the slave system after the tyrant's death could never be created in Cuba. [\*192] Those who find themselves in power after the tyrant's death will need to achieve the lifting of the embargo, and the most important leverage available for the Cuban people at that time for the holding of free elections is, precisely, the U.S. embargo. n92